Uncertainty affects the behaviour of fishers and fisheries regulators in a way that can adversely affect the sustainability of fish stocks and fisheries income and productivity. In agriculture there has been a long history of using levy funds and public and private insurance schemes to create mutual funds to mediate economic risks to growers resulting from environmental variability and quarantine risks. In the US, the federal government continues to underwrite funds (collected by contracted, private agents) used to protect contributors from the effects of extreme weather and pest and disease losses. In Europe there are examples of industry-based mutual funds to mediate risks from exotic potato diseases. For fisheries, insurance may provide a tool to address some elements of uncertainty in a way that would help both the fishing industry and the regulators achieve objectives of sustainability, income security, and productivity. Using stochastic models of future catches and the risk of depletion across various scenarios for a herring-type stock, we investigate how joint government and industry insurance funds may protect revenue and encourage increased sustainability of fisheries, and improve compliance and enforcement for fishery regulation. We also explore how fund exposure may be reduced by the application of reinsurance from private insurers for high cost but low probability events, such as fishery collapse. Although insurance may be a partial solution to unsatisfactory fisheries management and fishing performance, some potential drawbacks in the application of this novel approach are also discussed.
Introduction
Uncertainty affects the behaviour of fishers and fisheries regulators in a way that can adversely affect the sustainability of fish stocks, their productivity, and the income from fisheries, so increasing risks. Faced with declining catches, fishers may react in several ways that affect uncertainty of fish stocks and revenues. They may continue to fish at the regulation effort level, leave the industry, or they might increase catchability and/or effort by overexploiting resources in the short term. Risk can be reduced through structural design measures that move fishery management to become more "robust" to the uncertainty that ICES CM 2008/O:03 pervades fishery systems (Charles, 2007) . Insurance may provide such a tool by addressing some of this uncertainty in a way that would help fishers and regulators achieve shared objectives of sustainability, income, and productivity. However, the nature of fisheries risk (see Cunningham and Maguire, 2002) may determine what forms of insurance are appropriate and which cases of fisher behaviour constrain potential benefits from insurance.
Insurance mechanisms have long been used to mitigate financial risks presented by environmental and biosecurity uncertainties in agriculture (USDA RMA http://www.rma.usda.gov; Kartoffelafgiftsfonden, http://www.kartoffelafgiftsfonden.dk/;
Potatopol, http://www.potatopol.nl/; described in Waage et al., 2007) . However, the sources of uncertainty that can adversely affect fisheries are manifold and often more difficult to define, predict, and assess, and fisheries are often a shared resource where individuals have an incentive to act independently in their own self-interest. By contrast, the factors that affect agricultural outputs are often evident: the weather, pest infestations, disease outbreaks, etc.
Tthe question of what caused a decline in fisheries in most cases is impossible to answer with the same degree of confidence. Risks in agriculture are often heterogeneous over large areas,
whereas fisheries risks may often apply to the whole stock. Many fish stocks are cyclical owing to climatic and ecological factors, whereas others exhibit variability attributable to fluctuations in recruitment success, mortality, and migration. Continued exploitation can itself lead to greater variability in stock dynamics. An ever-larger component of the risks to which the fishing industry is exposed comes from socio-economic and political spheres, via interactions in prices, costs, labour availability, and regulation, for which it is hard to predict and plan.
The fishing industry has repeatedly pointed to difficulties in adjusting to large fluctuations in total allowable catch (TAC) between years. On the other hand, stability in TACs could threaten the sustainability of fishery resources unless TACs were set very conservatively (Kell et al., 2005) . Currently under the European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), management plans for many stocks specify interannual bounds on TACs. An alternative, or complementary, approach is to reduce the variation in revenues by insurance, rather than managing TACs directly.
Given the similarity of privately owned aquaculture to agriculture, we should expect that insurance schemes would be applied to aquaculture before they are extended to wild capture fisheries and, indeed, insurance in aquaculture is already widespread (Hotta, 1999) . Many capture fishing risks have been, and continue to be, covered by insurance, including vessel, gear and crew safety policies. However, the application of insurance to catch, price, or revenue variation is more problematic in wild fisheries, which explains the scarcity of examples in the literature. The harvests of several specific marine fisheries are already covered in Japan by a government-backed Mutual Insurance Scheme in which the aim is to maintain a viable industry to secure production capacity (Fisheries Agency, 2005) . The scheme enables fishers to share risks, shielding individual fishers from ruin caused by natural disasters and other uncertainties. However, the distinguishing feature of these fisheries is that the species are, like aquaculture, geographically well defined and contained, such as kelp, sedentary shellfish, and algae. Two important published studies concerning the application of insurance to genuinely wild capture, common resource, mobile fisheries exist. The first is a theoretical application of insurance theory by Ludwig (2002) to a generalized fishery; the second is a more applied approach in which the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) considered extending Risk Management Agency crop insurance principles to wild sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay, Alaska (Greenberg et al., 2002) .
A simulation model was used to evaluate the consequences of alternative insurance schemes. The model included dynamic feedback where the fishers respond to declining revenues attributable to falling catches by increasing exploitation. By stabilizing not just revenue but also exploitation pressure, insurance can be effective in reducing both financial risks to the fishers and biological risks to stocks. This modelling exercise not only demonstrates some benefits of insurance, but also some difficulties presented by an insurance scheme. It shows how stochastic simulations may be used to identify potential solutions or limitations in marine fisheries insurance. Outputs of the insurance model are discussed, and the direction of future work is presented.
Uncertainties arise from the various interactions in the ecology, environment, operation and regulation of a fishery (Figure 1a ). External influences ( Figure 1b ) contribute to the intrinsic factors affecting uncertainty. The model described here includes most of the factors in this system. Factors not included in the model, that future work could encompass, are: stock assessment/implementation feedback processes; the multispecies nature of many fisheries that gives fishers a range of species to exploit; and factors involving consumer influence on regulators. All these factors affect both the ecological sources of uncertainty and the uncertainties arising from the response of the fishing industry and regulators. Falling catches could stimulate overfishing to maintain incomes, concentrate the industry on fewer remaining boats to maintain catch per unit effort (cpue), and reduce the reliability of stock data as trust in the regulators falls. Rational responses to uncertainty, at least in the short term, are assumed to contribute to poor governance, along with a lack of trust in regulation aimed at a sound ecological approach to sustainable fisheries.
The EU's PRONE project, of which this work forms a part, is intended to define issues of risk in marine fisheries and to test a range of solutions to these problems. A principal objective of the project is to adapt risk analysis theory and practice to European fisheries, and to demonstrate a variety of tools to manage their risks. It also aims to develop improved riskmanagement mechanisms that ensure that the outputs of risk assessments are catalogued and that the management options available are adequately understood by stakeholders through effective risk communication. Insurance is one tool in this approach, and it may have applications within various constraints.
Uncertainty and governance in fisheries
Governance: the exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society's problems and affairs (World Bank, 1991) Commercial capture fisheries contain four well-defined entities that fall within the scope of governance: the fish stock(s), the regulators, the fishing industry, and the consumers. Figure 1a shows the links and the directions of influences of interactions among these entities. These in turn increase revenue risks for industry, whereas the regulator, whose objectives usually include both economic and ecological sustainability, faces a greater chance of being blamed for ineffective management
The four core areas are also subject to wider system influences beyond the reach of industry governance (Figure 1b Capture fishing has considerable intrinsic variance in catches, fishers may face short-term pressures to maintain their revenue, and there is a history of ineffective regulation. Insurance can help to address these problems by reducing the impact of natural variability on revenues, mitigating short-term pressures by spreading the risk burden over time, and participation in an insurance scheme can provide a greater stake in regulatory compliance (Mumford et al., 2008) . These benefits have all been observed in agriculture (Waage et al., 2007) .
It is the supposition here that the use of insurance to buffer revenue risks for fishers could contribute also to risk-reducing behaviour in other parts of the system. For example, it might increase compliance with a TAC through increased self-regulation, so for example, the industry would be more willing to adopt lower TACs and/or increase its own enforcement to protect its fund from payouts caused by increased stock variance from overfishing. Insurance payouts from the mutual fund in poor revenue years might also reduce the incentive to increase fishing pressure, so increasing the sustainability of exploitation. Issues of trust (between variously perceived naive environmentalists, cheating fishers, craven bureaucrats, under-resourced fisheries scientists, and pious academics) have been catalogued and semiquantified in other PRONE actions (Edvardsson et al., 2008) . The reallocation of responsibilities from governmental regulation to increased self-regulation by industry would represent a significant change in the governance approach. What follows is a description of a stochastic bio-economic model of a herring-like stock, to illustrate these hypotheses.
General modelling methods
A stochastic population dynamics model of a herring-like stock was developed to illustrate how the economic and biological stability of a fishery can be affected by an insurance regime.
This model allows us to explore, quantitatively, the links between risks introduced through either environmental or knowledge-related uncertainties and the risk introduced through implementation of fisheries management, along with the scale of insurance premium required to mediate the risk.
We assume that regulators aim to manage the fishery according to a maximum sustainable yield (MSY) objective by controlling effort rather than catch. However, the model allows for implementation uncertainty (harvest rates are variable) and for the strategic behaviour of fishers, who may respond to declines in catch or revenue with an increase in effort. One of the benefits of insurance is its potential to lead to a more risk-neutral behaviour among the insured. We model this feedback indirectly; the link is established via an assumption that fishers would increase effort to try to maintain their revenue whenever if declines.
The insurance policies modelled here are based on systems employed in agricultural risk management, such as the USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA). Revenue shortfalls are covered at pre-selected levels. Indemnity payments are triggered when the revenue falls below the covered proportion of an historical average (for example, the previous five years).
The size of an insurance payment depends on an agreed coverage level (CL), and a premium calculated for that level of coverage.
We calculate the size of a premium needed to guarantee that the insurance fund is sufficient to cover losses after the first 10 years of operations in 75% of the simulations.
Payouts from the mutual fund are capped at the 75th percentile. The excess above the maximum insurance fund payment is assumed to be covered by reinsurance; the premium charged to the fund for re-insurance is calculated separately. During the first 10 years of operation, the fund is allowed to borrow money at 8% interest to cover any payouts beyond the value of the fund. The insurance fund is assumed to earn 5% annual interest when not used to make payments. The introduction of reinsurance simulates the Potatopol use of reinsurance to limit fund exposure to high-cost, but low-probability, events.
The model used to explore an insurance role in fisheries management here is an extension of the model in Mumford et al. (2008) . The population model is stochastic and age-structured, with log-normal process errors in a Beverton-Holt-type stock-recruitment relationship. Prices are considered to be elastic with respect to the supply of fish. The MSY equilibrium harvest rate is computed from mean values of parameters (stock-recruitment, maturity, mortality, and weights-at-age) based on ICES' assessment of herring stocks, and this rate is the base harvest level applied throughout the runs of the model. For a full description of the model, see the Appendix.
To illustrate the role of insurance, five scenarios were modelled: 1) No insurance; no effort increase on falling revenue Expectation: noisy but stable mean net revenue;
2) No insurance; effort increase on falling revenue Expectation: noisy and declining mean net revenue;
3) Insurance; no effort increase on falling revenue Expectation: smoothed revenue, lower mean net revenue than Scenario 2 at the beginning and higher than Scenario 2 at the end of 30 years; 4) Insurance; effort increase on falling revenue, but effort modified by insurance payouts Expectation: smoothed revenue, lower mean net revenue than Scenario 2 at the beginning, but higher than Scenario 2 at the end of 30 years; 5) Insurance; 1% annual increase in fishing mortality attributable to an increase in catchability, no increase in effort on falling revenue Expectation: long-term downturn in stock stability and revenue.
Results Figure 2 shows median revenue trajectories for each of the five scenarios over 30 years.
Scenarios 1 and 3 are identical but for the application of insurance in the latter. The same applies to Scenarios 2 and 4, in which each has increased effort on falling revenues. Insurance start-up costs result in initial net revenue being lower (3, 4, 5) than in scenarios without insurance (1, 2), whereas increasing effort on falling revenue (2, 4) leads to higher initial revenues than in scenarios without effort increases (1, 3). Differences between Scenarios 1 and 3 are small, insurance in scenario 3 bolstering revenues in poorer years and smoothing the lows and softening the fall in revenue (see also Figure 5 later). In these two scenarios there is no linkage between revenue and effort, so the simulated fishers fish to the regulated MSY level, giving them relatively constant revenues over the 30-year simulation. Where fishers were simulated to increase short-term fishing effort to chase falling revenues compared with previous years (Scenarios 2 and 4) , there is an increase in the risk of stock collapse (Figure 3) , and a decline in the expected revenues over time (Figure 2 ). However, insurance triggers compensatory payments in years with falling revenue (set against the insurance cover level), and this reduces the pressure to increase fishing effort, so lessening the ecological risk from overfishing (compare Scenarios 4 and 2 in Figure 3 ). Scenario 5 simulates "technological creep", a steady improvement in catching efficiency through investment in better technology.
In that scenario, the actions of fishers not only maintain income but also increase income through increased short-term catch, and it could be that insurance stimulates investment in fishing technology by reducing risk. If so, then insurance only smoothes revenue in the short term, whereas steady increases in fishing effort cause long-term declines in the stock and hence long-term reductions in revenue. Table 1 shows the variance, the average annual variability (AAV), and the means and slopes of revenues for each of the scenarios modelled. Rademeyer et al. (2007) mention AAV as one of the measures of the success of a management strategy. Table 1 shows how insurance can decrease interannual variability in revenue. The revenue declines fastest when fishers are chasing revenue without the mitigating effect of insurance (Scenario 2). The revenue is highest where fishers comply with the MSY management and incur no insurance costs (Scenario 1). The difference in mean revenue between Scenarios 1 and 3 gives an indication of the relatively low potential cost of an insurance programme. Figure 3 shows how the modelled scenarios impact on the probability of stock collapse.
As above, Scenarios 1 and 3 are biologically neutral and have no impact on spawning-stock biomass (SSB), whereas Scenarios 2, 4, and 5 have varying levels of increased likelihood of stock collapse through time. The insurance instrument in Scenario 4 mitigates the long-term likelihood of stock collapse risk compared with Scenario 2. In Scenario 5, where fishers are simulated to increase fishing mortality annually through increased stock catchability, stock collapse risk also increases through time. Figure 4 shows the impacts of the five scenarios on long-term recruitment patterns as a result of varying fishing mortalities on SSB caused by differences between the five modelled scenarios. Figure 5 shows the revenues with and without insurance at two levels of revenue coverage: 80% and 100% coverage level (CL). The net revenue is that earned from fishing, inclusive of insurance payments and fund surplus redistribution, less premium payments when required to keep the fund at its agreed level. Note the revenue smoothing caused by the insurance payouts and the "soft landing" provided when there is a return to longer term average revenues after two peak periods around years 5 and 15. Note also that between years 1 and 10, the "with insurance (net)" revenue for 100% CL is lower than 80% CL for the second trajectory shown. This is because re-insurance premiums are much higher for 100% CL, to cover the greater probability of re-insurance use when the mutual (or first) fund has the same capped liability for each CL every year.
Discussion
"It was noted that uncertainty is a major factor of unsustainability, and that its effects increase as the fishery management system becomes more elaborate. In the absence of Figure 5a , years 6-11), giving a few years for longer term adjustment. Where there is a long-term decline in catch, insurance is not likely to be able to help. The level of insurance is important in determining the effect on subscribers; Figure 5a illustrates greater cushioning at higher CL (and thus higher cost) and Figure 5b shows that choosing higher rate coverage could lead to a more variable revenue attributable to irregular premium and dividend payments.
The focus of regulators tends to be towards increasing sustainability of exploitation and hence production. It is likely that the primary requirement of an insurance instrument would depend too upon increasing sustainability of production rather than solely protecting revenues. This could be built into an management strategy evaluation (MSE) modelling approach to test fisheries management actions.
Previous work (Mumford et al., 2008) used a purely reactive approach to insurance payment that acted like the salmon insurance example of Greenberg et al. (2002) , in which the sole purpose was to iron out the lows of revenue for the fishers. Scenarios 2 and 4 introduce dynamic feedback between the behaviour of fishers and the stock. In Scenario 4, insurance payments reduced the destabilizing effect on stocks caused by short-term increases in effort after revenue declines. This system closely resembles Ludwig's proposal (Ludwig, 2002) , and is more prospective than that described in Mumford et al. (2008) , because it reduces financial risk to fishers each year while satisfying regulators by dampening ecological risks from overfishing in the future.
The size of the payouts, and therefore the premiums, is influenced by all the factors that contribute to the variability in predictions. We can use the model to explore how changing the assumptions regarding the variability of model parameters could affect insurance. This is useful because certain sources of uncertainty are ultimately controllable: knowledge can be improved, reducing uncertainty in the estimates of model parameters, and fishing can be controlled to reduce both the level of exploitation and the variability of harvest rates. We can use the model to investigate the benefits of reducing the controllable sources of uncertainty measured by the lowered cost of insurance.
Currently under the European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the interannual variability in TACs for many stocks is constrained in order to allow the industry to plan their activities better. This, as Cunningham and Maguire (2002) point out, requires a level of control that may not be appropriate for unpredictable and complex systems such as fisheries; instead, insurance might provide a robust way of achieving the same result without the need for such strict control.
The CFP is also a potential setting for a Europe-wide insurance regime. If all stocks were insured in Europe, then at least in a future where structural reforms have taken place and fleet overcapacity is eliminated, a universal insurance scheme could be justified. It might make sense to set up a single-crop insurance scheme in agriculture, with discrete homogenous units, but insuring a single fish species may not work where fishers catch more than one species.
Moreover, it could be expensive, because in a single-species fishery, risks cannot be spread except over time. The conditions needed for the introduction of insurance should be determined, such as the impact of an insurance system on levels of stock health, using a MSE framework (e.g. Kell et al., 2007) . Here, we have demonstrated the potential application of insurance in fisheries, but have, we believe, shown that there are significant issues related to the threshold values that trigger payouts, the level at which funds are capped, and whether premiums are constant, variable, or fixed.
Conclusions
The ideal situation is a perfectly managed fishery, based on sound scientific evidence and long-term rational behaviour by fishers. However, this rarely occurs, so there is a role for economic mechanisms that help to address the many issues of uncertainty that affect adverse behavioural responses by fishers and short-term regulatory changes. Insurance can provide some mitigation against these uncertainties, and along with other measures that give a longterm stake in the fishery, it can result in significant improvements in modelled fisheries compared with uninsured fisheries.
Insurance helps to transform the governance framework through:
• establishing more convergent objectives among stakeholders (industry, regulators, and consumers) with particular regards to economic and biological sustainability;
• leading to changes in responsibility ( "shifting the burden of risk");
• increasing trust between regulators, industry, and scientists;
• providing incentives for industry to increase knowledge in order to reduce uncertainty and hence premiums (interest from an industry insurance fund could pay for research and such industry funded research might be more trusted by industry, improving compliance with the resulting scientific advice);
• providing immediate feedback into the system through fisher anticipation of insurance stabilizing revenue, rather than lagged responses by regulators that may be too late to influence dynamic ecological processes.
There are, of course, some limits to the role of insurance:
• concern that insurance could interfere with efforts to reduce capacity in the fishery by essentially subsidizing fishers who would otherwise leave either permanently or temporarily (Greenberg et al., 2002) ;
• economic incentives may mean that insurance pay-outs do not reduce fishing effort (as in our Scenario 5 with increasing technological capacity in harvesting), and enforcement would still be required. Figure 2 . Median revenues for five modelled scenarios: 1) No insurance, no effort increase on falling revenue; 2) No insurance, effort increase on falling revenue; 3) Insurance, no effort increase on falling revenue; 4) Insurance, effort increase on falling revenue; 5) Insurance, 1% annual increase in fishing mortality. (100% coverage level for Scenarios 3, 4, and 5; maximum effort increase = 1.7 for Scenarios 2 and 4). In colour please Figure 3 . Probability of stock collapse risk, that spawning-stock biomass (SSB) falls below B pa in a particular year under the five scenarios: 1) No insurance, no effort increase on falling revenue; 2) No insurance, effort increase on falling revenue; 3) Insurance, no effort increase on falling revenue; 4) Insurance, effort increase on falling revenue; 5) Insurance, 1% annual increase in fishing mortality (100% coverage level in Scenarios 3, 4, and 5; maximum effort increase =1.7 for Scenarios 2 and 4). In colour please Figure 4 . Median recruitment for five modelled scenarios: 1) No insurance, no effort increase on falling revenue; 2) No insurance, effort increase on falling revenue; 3) Insurance, no effort increase on falling revenue; 4) Insurance, effort increase on falling revenue; 5) Insurance, 1% annual increase in fishing mortality (100% coverage level in scenarios 3, 4, and 5; maximum effort increase =1.7 in Scenarios 2 and 4). In colour please Figure 5 . An example of how insurance works in Scenario 3 (insurance, no effort increase on falling revenue) at two revenue coverage levels (CL), 80% and 100% CL for two trajectories, (a) where insurance provides a soft landing from a period of extraordinary luck (see years 6-11), and (b) where insurance mitigates losses during unexpectedly bad year(s) (see year 9). Figure A1 . The line represents a random recruitment trajectory alongside the estimated recruitment time-series for the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock for 1951-2007 (data are shown as points). Figure A2 . Building an insurance fund over 30 years in four simulated scenarios, this example assumes 100% revenue coverage level (CL). Note that the fund sometimes exceeds the fund cap because of the fixed premium level. In colour please 
where C denotes catch (in billions of fish), N the number of herring (in billions of fish), and H is the harvest rate.
Yield (Y) is given in millions of tonnes: years is shown in Figure A1 , along with a random modelled trajectory for a herring-like stock over a sample period of the same length.
For the older groups, the transition from year to year is modelled by ) exp( , , , 
(A10)
To calculate the premium, we use a search algorithm that finds the minimum premium required such that the insurance fund raised is sufficient to cover up to the 75 th percentile value of the annual payouts over all simulated scenarios. The insurance fund is capped, so that annual premium payments are suspended while the fund is at its capped value, and the interest earned is returned to policy-holders on an annual basis. This is referred to as the mutual fund.
During the first ten years, the fund is allowed to borrow money if needed at 8% interest;
conversely the money not used for payouts is invested at a 5% annual rate of interest ( Figure   A2 ). The operating costs are assumed to add 10% to the total premium collected for the mutual fund.
The upper 25% of liability is covered by private re-insurance bought in the market. The premium for re-insurance, Ψ , is calculated by adding a 25% profit margin to the expected annual re-insurance payouts ( 
